The working man in Queensland by Kelly, Pat. et al.
568 
THE WORKING MAN IN QUEENSLAND 
[Symposium by University of Queensland Honours 
Students at the Monthly General Meeting of the 
Historical Society of Queensland, Inc., on 25th 
October 1951.] 
A. Governor Bowen and the Working Man 
By MISS PAT KELLY 
It is not often that the governor of a self-govern-
ing colony comes into direct contact with the working 
man in his everyday problems; nor, in the years 1860-
1867, was labour sufficiently solidified to be influential 
as a political party. Nevertheless the labourer, the 
artisan and the tradesman were imbued with demo-
cratic spirit and so sure of themselves as to believe 
that they had as much right to advise the governor as 
had the Squatter Legislature.. Although there were 
attempts to fix wages and hours, for example among 
the stonemasons at Ipswich and the journeymen tailors 
in Brisbane, the main concerns of the colony at this 
time were not primarily social but political and the 
establishment of the government superseded all other 
interests, even among the workers themselves. 
As for Sir George Bowen', his association with the 
working classes during his term of office in Queensland 
was to him a novel and enlightening experience. To 
one who had lived in the placid company of Greek 
studies, the rough ways of the colonists were often dis-
concerting. But although he had never had experience 
in handling social problems Sir George had been in 
Vienna during the 1848 rebellions and was resident in 
Corfu at the time of the rise of Greek nationalism. 
Coming to Queensland he was met by hearty demo-
cracy of the colonists, newly flushed with their victory 
over an unpopular government. "Remember," Lord 
Lytton had warned him in a letter of 29th April 1859, 
"that the first care of a Governor in a free colony is to 
shun the reproach of being a party man." No sooner 
had he stepped ashore in Brisbane than Bowen had his 
first contact with party feelings, and it was perhaps 
with Lord Lytton's words in mind that he answered 
the deputation of Working Men. "I perceive, gentle-
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men, that you characterise your address as proceeding 
from 'Working Men.' I feel certain, however, that you 
do not mean by that phrase to imply that you belong 
to any separate class whose feelings and interests are 
adverse to, or even distinct from, the feelings and in-
terests of any other class of the inhabitants of this 
colony. In a new and free country like that in which 
we are living, where there are no paid idlers or sine-
curists, every man. Governors, Judges, Magistrates, 
Clergy and all—every man, I repeat, is emphatically a 
working man. . . . You will at all times find me your 
zealous fellow workman in all that may tend to pro-
mote the happiness and welfare of the people of 
Queensland." This reply has been stated at some 
length, because it was more than a statement of policy, 
it was a statement of principle, and Bowen adhered to 
it throughout his term of office. 
While retaining strictly the principle of non-inter-
ference in the domestic concerns of the colony, Bowen 
encouraged and approved such measures for social re-
form as were passed by the Legislature, but since he 
was so often in the public eye, through his many tours, 
his speeches and through the detailed reports of the 
newspapers, it was generally understood, and with 
some justice, that his guiding hand rested heavily on 
the rudder of state. This led to two misconceptions: 
firstly, that if Bowen had so much power, he should 
use it to further the interests of those outside Parlia-
ment (and since it was a squatter Parliament, this 
meant city and working-class interests) ; and secondly, 
that by using this powfer he was interfering with the 
democratic rights which the working class possessed 
through their elected representatives. Such conflicting 
accusations as these emanated from the local radical 
newspapers, and from frequent and noisy public meet-
ings, "got up," according to Robert Herbert, "by a 
petty clique, and attended only by a very small and 
uninfluential section of the tradesmen and labouring 
classes in Brisbane" and which "have long been the 
laughing stock of the entire colony and especially of 
the educated and intelligent portion of the inhabitants 
of this city.*') Bowen held a similar view* )^ that such 
movements were regarded with ridicule and contempt 
and were soon forgotten. Mindful of conditions in 
(1) Letter to Bowen, 2nd March 1864. 
(2) Despatch to the Secretary of State, I7th April 1861. 
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England and Europe, Bowen could see no reason for 
labour discontent in Queensland and as early as 6th 
September 1861 informed the Secretary of State that 
"popular agitations were strangled in their birth by 
being superseded" (by legislation). This is not meant 
to imply that Bowen was in league with the squatter 
aristocracy, for he was a man governed by reasonable 
logic and a strong sense of duty. It was his duty to 
mould and discipline the State so that he was very 
pleased, for example, when copper and not gold was 
discovered at Clinton in 1861, since copper was not so 
likely to disturb violently the ordinary relations of 
labour and capital. 
There are three main issues which brought Gov-
ernor Bowen into contact with working-class opinion. 
The first of these was the question of immigration, as 
a source of labour and colonisation. Bowen had set 
his views out clearly as early as 6th June 1860. He 
explained to the Duke of Newcastle that Queensland 
could become the great primary producer of cotton 
and sugar for the secondary industries of Britain, in 
place of America. European immigration could be 
used to form a backbone of small capitalists, but where 
the climate was too hot, Indian and Chinese coolies 
could become supplementary to white labour. He was 
careful to stress this latter point. Confident of the 
acceptance of his plan Bowen cultivated the interest 
of the Manchester cotton firms and the sugar interests 
of Mincing Lane. Though he met with half-hearted 
support in the Legislative Assembly and a Bill was 
passed allowing anyone to import Indian coolies at 
their own expense, the wide and violent opposition of 
the labouring classes ensured that it was never brought 
into effect. "Only let the colony be overflown with 
Chinese coolies," ran the "Courier's" editorial on 10th 
June 1862, "and these would be the classes whom the 
squatter would employ, on account of cheap labour." 
Open-air meetings and critical correspondence in the 
papers had forced Bowen to admit, by April 1861, that 
with the people in their present state of mind the 
importation of Chinese would be impossible; and by 
January 1866 he had informed the English manufac-
turers that cotton could only be a success in Queens-
land if they were wUling to apply their own labour 
and capital. By that time, however, American cotton 
was again in good supply and the opportunity pre-
571 
sented by the Civil War had been missed. As to Euro-
pean immigration, Bowen endorsed the popular view 
that only capitalists and manual labourers should be 
encouraged to enter Queensland, since there were 
absolutely no openings for educated men without trade 
or capital. Two classes of immigrants annoyed Bowen 
greatly: the Irish, who would take the poorest of jobs 
and then spend the rest of their time in political agita-
tion ; and those educated but penniless young men who 
came to him with letters of introduction from states-
men in England. He had set up the Civil Service as an 
openly competitive body and insisted that it remain 
such. 
The second point of contact was, in Governor 
Bowen's own words, that the "Colonial Ministry is 
practically regarded by the ultra-democratic section of 
these communities as an almost independent Executive 
Board."'3) There was no real understanding of Bowen's 
position in regard to his local and Imperial responsibili-
ties, and it says much for his tact and personality that 
he was able, again and again, to avoid the demands 
sent to him by the public meetings without vitally 
offending the feelings of those concerned. Take, for 
example, his visit to Rockhampton in October 1862. 
The northern merchants, feeling themselves neglected, 
sent a deputation to Bowen requesting that he procure 
for them such things as a steam dredge, a new high-
way to the mountains, increased immigration, and tele-
graphic communications with southern ports.'*) Bowen 
said that their demands were reasonable, but since 
Parliament was in recess and his hands were tied what 
did they expect him to do. The deputation of worthy 
merchants replied, undaunted, that he could summon a 
special session of parliament and since he was not 
gagged as well as bound, he could tell the Executive 
Council to pass their demands through Parliament. 
Such was the working class interpretation of demo-
cratic government that they apparently believed that 
such petitions, drawn up at public meetings, could be 
pushed by the Governor into the Parliamentary pro-
gramme. On 5th March 1864 a petition for his re-
moval was sent to the Secretary of State as a result of 
the "refusal of His Excellency, the Governor of the 
colony, to receive certain resolutions, passed at a pre-
(3) Despatch to the Secretary of State, 18th August 1866. 
(4) "Courier," 31st October 1862. 
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vious meeting of the ratepayers." Bowen's refusal was 
based on the contents of the resolutions being critical 
of his responsible ministers, but the illustrations show 
with what seriousness the meetings were attended. 
Nor did they stop at political criticism but accused 
Bowen of parsimony because he sent to the cheaper 
market of Sydney for his household supplies,(5) or of 
extravagance, because one of the first acts passed in 
1860 was to increase his salary by £2,000 a year, and 
they did not hesitate to caU his speeches "tedious, 
prolix and unnecessarily lengthy."*^) 
On the 13th February 1866 Bowen reported to the 
Secretary of State, "this colony is enjoying at the 
present moment . . . a profound political and social 
quietude." Within seven months, he was forwarding 
another petition for his removal. The year 1866 began 
with a severe four months' drought; a crisis developed 
in the ministry; finally came the crash of Agra and 
Masterman's Bank, which had guaranteed Queens-
land's public works programme. This was on the 11th 
July 1866. When Bowen was forced to interfere to 
prevent the issue of "greenbacks" or Legal Tender 
Notes, which were Bell's only solution, the workers 
saw this as support for the Bankers and Capitalists. 
Bowen became the "enemy of the working class,"*'') be-
cause he dictated to Parliament the course it must 
adopt. Bowen, of course, saw it as an Imperial matter 
and interfered only to save the colony from itself. 
The sectional nature of the agitations at this time is 
shown by his letter to an English statesman, («) that 
once the Treasury Bills were issued there followed not 
the slightest question or condemnation of his conduct 
in the Legislature. But there were many artisans who 
had been dismissed due to the suspension of Public 
Works. It was some months before these could be 
assured of settled jobs again. Informed by the Press 
that it was Bowen's interference that had cost them 
their jobs, they gathered on 9th August in a mass 
meeting outside Parliament House, and, whipped up by 
the local demagogues, threatened to march on Govern-
ment House, to imprison Bowen as Bligh had been, 
and to burn down his residence as the Canadians had 
done to Lord Elgin. But the mob was made to think 
(5) "Darling Downs Gazette," 2nd January 1868. 
(6) "Guardian." 22nd September 1860. 
(7) Despatch to the Secretary of State, 10th September 1866. 
(8) Lelter to an English Statesman. 20th November 1866. 
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twice by one speaker who reminded them "that if they 
should make a personal attack on the Governor, it 
would probably be found, from the well-known deter-
mination of his character, that they had raised a devil 
which it would be difficult to lay again."(») It says 
much for Bowen's character that the mob was con-
vinced by this observation to abandon their threats in 
his direction, but it compromised by attacking the 
leading ministers as they left the Assembly. By his 
conduct during this crisis, however, Bowen proved the 
active neutrality of the Governor, and though he 
passed through yet another ministerial crisis and the 
subsequent election he was never again violently 
attacked for either inaction or dictatorship. 
Sir George Bowen was the perfect Governor to 
have given to a new self-governing colony. He achieved 
popularity and discipline and taught the colonists that 
the fruits of democracy are bitter without law and 
order, and when separated from intelligence and cour-
tesy. As for the working men, they came to accept the 
code of conduct only after many lessons; annoyed at 
first, in their brusque colonial fashion, at his intellec-
tual airs and his insistence on a paternal oversight of 
their affairs, they saw at last the strict justness of his 
policy and came to recognise a mutual interest in the 
prosperity of the colony. "No man, who has not him-
self tried it," sighed Bowen in July 1865, "can know 
how difficult and harrassing is the position of a 
Governor in a new colony." "But," he added, "no man 
who has not himself tried it can know the pleasure and 
thankfulness . . . at seeing . . . a strong, self-reliant, 
and prosperous state . . . fast growing up under his 
rule from such smaU beginnings." 
B. The Queensland Gold Miner and the Chinese 
Question (1873-1890) 
By MISS JUNE STOODLEY, B.A. 
It was the discovery of gold which first brought 
an influx of Chinese to Australia, and was thus an in-
direct 'origin of the White Australia Policy. Before 
the 1851 discovery in New South Wales, as Myra Wil-
lard points out,(i) the entry of Chinese into Australia 
(9) Despatch lo the Secretary of State, 10th September 1866. 
(1) Myra Willard: "History of the White Australia Policy," p. 17. 
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had been so negligible as to go almost unnoticed, but 
the huge influx on to the southern goldfields roused 
alarm on the part not only of the miners themselves— 
who on three notable occasions resorted to violence— 
but of the people as a whole. The governments of Vic-
toria and of New South Wales were forced to pass 
legislation restricting the entry of Chinese, and this, 
together with the gradual decrease in alluvial wealth 
on the southern fields, led to a decline in their numbers. 
The matter seemed to be settled, and the restrictive 
legislation was repealed in both States. In the 'seven-
ties, however, the question revived—this time in 
Queensland—with stronger force than ever, inspiring 
further restrictive legislation not only in Queensland 
but also in most of Australia. 
, Queensland had the experience of the southern 
States, and also of California, to guide her actions, and 
by taking advantage of this she managed to avoid any 
major clashes between white and Chinese diggers such 
as had occurred at Buckland River in Victoria and at 
Burrangong in New South Wales. Here the outrages 
committed by the white diggers seem to have been 
largely due to the slowness of the Government to act 
on their behalf; no such excuse could be raised in 
Queensland, and in fact no serious riots did occur here. 
Minor friction was not lacking, however, and as early 
as the Canoona rush in 1858 there had been a clash; 
but in spite of such minor clashes the question did not 
assume serious proportions until the enormous influx 
of Chinese to the Palmer field. 
By the end of 1876 the Chinese were definitely pre-
dominant on the Palmer field, partly because the 
1876 rush to the Hodgkinson had drained the field of 
white diggers and allowed Chinese to occupy the aban-
doned claims. That the Chinese were present in such 
numbers on the field, however, was also partly due to 
the attitude of the white diggers in the early days of 
the rush, when conditions were almost those of gold 
repletion. Thus, the feeling on at least one occasion— 
the arrival of a cargo of 5,000 Chinese—was that there 
was "plenty for all."'^) It was not until gold became 
less plentiful, and the growing population of Asiatics 
on some fields began to outnumber the Europeans, that 
alarm and resentment arose among the white miners, 
and representations began to be made to Parliament 
(1) Jack Cutting Book. p. 58; article by Roy Connolly. 
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for action against the Chinese. This alarm was ex-
pressed, too, by other members of the goldfields popu-
lation—for example a petition from the Charters 
Towers field in 1877 was signed by traders, graziers, 
artisans and other residents as well as by miners, ex-
pressing alarm that in some parts of North Queens-
land the Chinese were "from ten to fifteen to one in 
excess of the European population."f^) (In fact, the 
Chinese miners on the Palmer field at the end of 1877 
outnumbered the European by at least 52 to 1.^ *)) 
The chief arguments brought against the Chinese 
did not aU directly concern goldmining, though since 
it was on the goldfields that the Chinese were accumu-
lated at this stage, all had at least an indirect connec-
tion. It was argued that the Asiatics did not contri-
bute their fair share to the revenue, chiefly by evasion 
of miners' right fees; that the colony was forced to 
pay an excessive amount for police protection, quaran-
tine and hospital unkeep, for their benefit or because 
of their presence; that they took much gold away from 
the colony; that they were a degraded and immoral 
class whose infiuence on the colony would be perni-
cious ; that they would bring in dreadful diseases; that 
they monopolised the alluvial gold so necessary to the 
European miner as a wage fund untU he could begin 
quartz mining; that they did not do their share of 
prospecting, but merely moved in once a field had been 
discovered, and into claims only temporarily aban-
doned; and that their wastefulness spoiled the Euro-
pean's chances. This is roughly the order of impor-
tance which Premier Thorn and his supporters gave to 
these arguments in 1876, but this was probably because 
the BiU he was introducing was ostensibly intended to 
force the Chinese "to contribute their fair share to the 
increased expenditure which their presence imposed on 
the colony, and to pay a fair premium for the privilege 
accorded to them of securing and taking away from the 
colony the gold that fairly belonged to the com-
munity."(*) The real aim, as was later admitted, was 
to restrict the number of Chinese immigrants, and 
generally to discourage Chinese immigration, for 
underlying all these specific arguments was the radical 
issue—the fear that the Chinese would either come to 
(2) V. & P. 1877, Vol. II, p. 120.3. 
(3) Mines Report Staristics for 1877, V. & P. 1878, Vol II, p. 311. 
(4) P.M.G. Mein, introducing 1876 Bill in Council: Q.P.D., Vol. XX, 1876, p. 618. 
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outnumber the European population in the north, or at 
least would force down the standard of living by their 
competition with white labour. However, it is the 
validity or otherwise of the specific anti-Chinese argu-
ments, in their relation to the gold fields, that wiU be 
discussed here. 
It was argued, first, that they did not contribute 
their share to revenue, chiefly by evading payment of 
the miner's right fee of 10/-. It was true enough that 
they did evade this fee, and even more so after the 
Act of 1877 raised the fee, for Asiatics, to £3, but as 
Warden SeUheim of the Palmer field remarked in 
1879,(1) in this evasion they did not differ vastly from 
the Europeans. As to contributioh to revenue through 
dutiable goods, it would seem that many of them im-
ported dutiable delicacies (including opium) from the 
East whenever they earned enough to do so, though 
this might not apply to the very poorest coolies. Hodg-
kinson, for example, reported (2) that a Chinese out of 
luck could exist on 8/- per week, and the average spent 
only 13/- or 14/—but the profuse, he added, might 
spend an indefinite amount. It would seem that though 
this argument had some elements of truth, the Chinese 
were not alone in evading fees, whUe though the 
majority of them did not spend so lavishly as the white 
diggers, many did contribute to revenue by dutiable 
imports. 
It was also argued that the Chinese did not invest 
their gold in the colony, but stayed only long enough 
to scrape together one or two hundred pounds' worth 
of gold, which they then took back to China. This 
was undeniable, and gold was also sent or smuggled 
back to China. Warden SeUheim pointed out,*^) how-
ever, that the average Chinese digger earned only 
£46/17/- in 1877 (this was actually somewhat less than 
Mines Report statistics would indicate, but the average 
for five years between 1877 and 1881 was only £57). 
At the then lowest living rate of 14/- per week, he 
argued, very little margin remained, so that by far the 
greater part of the gold sent to China must be in ex-
change for merchandise. Whatever the size of in-
dividual earnings, however, the number of Chinese in 
the colony made for a total gold export to China of 
(1) V. &P. 1880, Vol. II, p. 597. 
(2) V. &P. 1882, Vol. II, p. 760. 
(3) V. & P. 1878, Vol. II, p. 312. 
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formidable proportions—in 1877 the open, direct ship-
ment (including savings of homeward-bound Chinese) 
amounted to £205,250,(i) quite a large sum at that stage 
of the colony's development, and probably a conserva-
tive estimate in view of the smuggling of gold that was 
believed to take place. 
One of the most persistent claims against the 
Chinese was that they caused the colony vast expense 
in return for their inadequate contribution to revenue, 
this expense being for police protection, for quarantine, 
and for hospital maintenance. This claim seems to 
have been much exaggerated, and, as Earl Carnarvon 
pointed out,'^) there is no trace of any real calculation 
having been made. As to the police expenditure, the 
Commissioner's Reports consistently maintain that the 
number of police depended on the area of territory to 
be protected and on the temper of the blacks in that 
area, rather than on the population within it. As the 
largest proportion of the population in some areas, the 
(^hinese did of course gain most benefit from protec-
tion there. It is undeniable, too, that they caused the 
Government expense for quarantine enforcement— 
though scarcely an "enormous amount" as was claimed. 
The cost for 1877 at Cooktown, where most Chinese 
disembarked, was only £150, for example. Nor does 
the grievance of hospital expenditure seem to have 
rested on anything more than the numbers of the 
Chinese in the Cooktown hospital, where in view of 
their proportion to the white population it was inevit-
able that they should outnumber the white patients. 
The whole argument of vast expenditure caused 
by the Chinese in proportion to their contribution to 
the revenue was grossly exaggerated, and was appar-
ently based on little real evidence. 
A more important argument was that the Chinese 
were degraded and immoral colonists, who would in 
time bring down the wage and living standards of the 
whole colony. There may have been something in this 
fear, especially as the majority of Chinese immigrants 
were coolies of the poorest type, imported by head men 
under contract as diggers or packers, and apparently 
used as sweated labour. Certainly it was a potent fac-
tor in rousing agitation against Chinese immigration, 
(1) Based on Mines Report Sta t is t ics , V. & P . 1878, Vol. I I , p . 312. 
(2) V. & P . 1877, Vol . I. p . 815 : Despatch to Premier s tat ing that assent to the , \cl 
of 1876 was refused. 
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both in California and in the Australian colonies. As 
to their moral depravity, however, there was consider-
able exaggeration by some Members of the Legislature, 
who represented the average Chinese as an opium-
soaked, gambling and disorderly wretch of no moral 
standards. Yet Warden Hodgkinson on the Palmer in 
1882 stated that opium-smoking held "the same moral 
relation with the alien as that of spirits does with the 
European"—that is, the average Chinese was not a 
habitual or excessive opium smoker. Nor do fears 
based on the absence of Chinese women among the 
immigrants seem to have been substantiated, if statis-
tics of arrests are reliable evidence. They were, cer-
tainly, addicted to gambling, but riots were infrequent. 
The general opinion among unbiased observers with 
first-hand experience of the Chinese was, in fact, that 
they were a quiet, orderly, decent and industrious 
people. 
The charge of a low living standard among the 
Chinese can be better substantiated, for as has been 
mentioned the Chinese were a thrifty race, many of 
them living at the minimum subsistence rate in order 
to save their money to return to China. Their diet, 
however, though that of the poorest coolies was mainly 
rice and a little meat, seems to have been augmented 
wherever possible, and the more fortunate imported 
luxuries from China. Mr. J. W. CoUinson also men-
tions, <i) as part of their diet, products from their own 
gardens, piggeries, banana farms or rice mills (for by 
no means all Chinese were miners). Neglect of sani-
tation seems to have been a fairly strong argument 
here, and on it is blamed their susceptibility to "Palmer 
fever." 
The further claim that the Chinese were likely to 
introduce dangerous diseases was justified in the early 
stages of their immigration, but the introduction of 
quarantine proved effective in preventing any major 
outbreak. 
The miners themselves, however, were most con-
cerned with lesser issues directly touching their own 
interests. They complained, for example, that the 
Chinese were wasteful on the fields, and one Member of 
Parliament who was himself a miner went so far as to 
say that he believed the European's dislike of the 
(1) J. W. CoUinson: "Tropic Coasts and Tablelands," p. 15. 
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Chinese rested on the fact that where the latter had 
been "the chance of a European making a living was 
lost for ever."(2) This in fact was true, for the Chinese 
were in general so thorough in their working of the 
alluvial that there was little chance of anyone else 
finding even a grain of gold dust after the Chinese had 
worked and re-worked the ground. The Member was 
referring to wastefulness, however, particularly in re-
gard to water. He claims that the Chinese monopolised 
all the available water, and rendered it- unfit not only 
for cooking but even for gold-washing (since gold was 
likely to be lost in muddy water). It is true that water 
was a very precious commodity on a goldfield, and that 
wastage of it would be regarded by the miners as in-
excusable. During the dry period of the year this was 
particularly so, and it is quite often reported that due 
to lack of water alluvial workers had to abandon their 
claims until the wet season returned. It would seem 
that here the Chinese may have given cause for com-
plaint. As to waste of the alluvial ground by "muUock-
ing it up," this is hard to credit, for the painstaking 
care of the Asiatics is shown in many reports,(i) which 
picture them working and reworking the ground so 
that not a pennyweight escaped. It could be argued 
perhaps that their primitive methods may have caused 
unconscious waste, but this is doubtful, whUe more 
efficient methods (by large groups) were not unknown 
or even uncommon among them. 
The argument could, in fact, be turned back on the 
white miners themselves, for not only were the latter 
likely to throw up their claims in disgust if they did 
not show excellent returns, especially when gold was 
plentiful in the early days of a field, but even when 
quartz mining was under way the Palmer Warden 
(SeUheim) complained that "the majority of the reefs 
are operated on in a capricious manner, by a floating 
population," whUe often "as the (temporary) owner 
has no interest in the future of his claim, it is mul-
locked up and the ground is destroyed."^^^ Thus the 
white miners themselves were by no means blameless 
in the matter of wastefulness. 
One of the most persistent grievances was that 
the Asiatic did not share the burden of prospecting 
(2) McLean: Q.P.D. 1876, Vol. XX, p. 375. 
(1) E.G. Mines Reports for 1877 and 1879. 
(2) Mines Report, V. & P. 1879, VoL II, p. 398. 
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with the European, but "kept himself in reserve untU 
the goldfleld was established or proclaimed; then he 
appeared on the scene, for the purpose of reaping the 
benefit of the enterprise and discovery of the Euro-
pean." f^ ) To a certain extent this was true, for their 
painstaking fossicking usually gave them a living, and 
they apparently had no ambition for the rewards 
offered for discovery of a field. They were, of course, 
(3) Mein (P .M.G. ) : Q.P .D. 1876, Vol . XX, p . 618 ( C o u n c i l ) . 
very much afraid of the blacks, and with reason, for 
hundreds of Chinese were kUled in ambush on the 
Palmer. 
It is not true to say, however, that the Chinese 
never prospected—on such a large field as the Palmer, 
for instance, a certain amount of prospecting was still 
necessary within the field itself. The most complete 
contradiction of the argument, however, is that the 
Chinese did discover at least two fields—the LukinviUe 
in 1878 and the Russell in 1887. Apart from this, a 
large percentage of every goldfield population, whites 
included, never engaged in prospecting, but made up a 
restless floating population drifting from one field to 
another and joining in all the new rushes. The issue, 
then, was hardly a valid anti-Chinese argument. 
It was also claimed that the Chinese moved in on 
abandoned claims to which the European digger might 
want to return, a move which was perfectly legal what-
ever resentment it might arouse among the dispos-
sessed, for the regulations provided that a claim must 
not be left for more than twenty-four hours (exclud-
ing Sunday), or it could be occupied by another miner. 
Thus this particular grievance, though based on fact, 
and probably the most bitter to the diggers—it caused 
many small clashes—was of little real validity as an 
argument for expulsion or restriction of the Chinese. 
A more important argument was that the Chinese 
monopolised the alluvial ground, that by so doing they 
deprived the European miner of the wage fund that 
would have enabled him to develop reef mining, and 
that they actually squeezed out the alluvial miners 
from the fields. It was true enough that the Chinese 
did monopolise the alluvial land in the north, largely 
through their vast numbers, but partly because they 
were more stable and industrious than many of the 
whites. Whereas many of the Europeans were only 
too ready to leave their old claims at the first rumour 
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of a new rush, the Chinese were content to remain on 
the same field, and to take their chance on some of the 
abandoned claims. They were, moreover, content with 
a far smaller return than was the European, and they 
worked and reworked such fields as the Palmer long 
after the alluvial yield had become too poor to occupy 
the European alluvial miner. Such a state of affairs 
did give the impression that the Chinese had pushed 
out the whites, and it was further argued(i) that Euro-
peans simply would not remain where the Chinese were 
in such numbers. There appears to be no evidence, 
however, that the presence of the Chinese on the 
Palmer did actually drive the European out. The 
Warden, for example, ascribed the decline in the Euro-
pean population there to the superior attractions of the 
Hodgkinson field, where cost of living was cheaper; to 
the general tendency of the digger to be always on the 
move; to the lack of sufficient outside investment or 
loans; and to lack of communications with the coast.<2> 
The point was also made that Chinese exhaustion 
of the alluvial fields prevented the latter from giving 
employment to a large European population, and 
Thorn<2) cited examples of large white populations 
being reduced to very few white inhabitants. Though 
Thorn's argument is weak—for decline in numbers was 
always a natural result of exhaustion of the alluvial— 
it does seem that the rapidity of the exhaustion was 
due to the numbers of the Chinese. 
The importance of the alluvial, it was stated, was 
that it provided a wage fund which enabled the white 
miner to begin reefing operations, while the Chinese 
did not atempt to invest their earnings in quartz min-
ing, which might have benefited the colony, but took 
all of their savings out of the country. Thus the pre-
sence of the Chinese hindered development of the in-
dustry and of the colony as a whole. The argument 
could be raised, however, that the Europeans them-
selves often squandered their earnings from the 
aUuvial instead of using it to open up the quartz reefs, 
especially immediately after a rush. Not all, then, 
made use of the alluvial wage fund held to be so neces-
sary to them. It does seem, however, that the point 
held some truth, and it certainly carried weight in the 
(1) Douglas: Q.P.D. 1877, Vol. XXIII, p. 248. 
(2) Mines Report, V. & P. 1878, Vol II, p. 310. 
(3) Q.P.D. 1877, Vol. 23, p. 235. 
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Legislature: the Act of 1878 prevented Chinese from 
moving on to a new field for three years after its dis-
covery, unless a Chinese had discovered it. It was be-
lieved that in three years the European diggers could 
take all they wanted from a field, and it was then safe 
to allow the Chinese to fossick on it. 
On the argument that the Chinese elbowed the 
whites out and monopolised the alluvial, it can be 
concluded that their numbers in effect did mean a 
monopoly of the alluvial ground, and that this did re-
move from the Europeans a wage fund which might 
have made quartz mining more general and more 
efficiently worked, because of the added capital applied 
to it. Whether this retarded the development of min-
ing or the progress of the colony to any appreciable 
degree is not easy to decide, but it would hardly seem 
to have been as important as the agitation made it 
appear. 
These last few grievances were only minor issues 
connected with the Chinese question, but they seem to 
have been those which most closely touched the miners 
themselves. The other objections raised were not 
mining grievances as such, but were based on general 
fears (well-grounded or otherwise) of the effects of 
too large a Chinese immigration on the colony and on 
living standards in general. To bolster up the case for 
restriction of Chinese immigration, and in some cases 
even for expulsion of the existing Chinese population, 
arguments purporting to show their general undesir-
abUity were thus put forward, in most cases based on 
exaggeration of the real situation. 
The proportionate influence of the miners them-
selves in the passage of restrictive legislation is thus 
hard to disentangle, because the fears of other sections 
of the community aU had their influence. Palmer may 
have been accurate in saying, in 1890, that "the great 
outcry against the Chinese comes from the miners," 
but how far he was justified in maintaining that "it is 
in deference to their wishes that most of the restric-
tive legislation has been passed"(i) is more difficult to 
discover. Weight does seem to have been given to 
their grievances in the Legislature, as members of an 
industry important to the colony, and as those most 
immediately affected by the Chinese immigration 
(1) Q.P.D. 1890, Vol. LXI, p. 537. Speaking on the New GoldBelds Bill. 
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(since the vast majority of the Chinese population in 
Queensland was collected on the goldfields). Further, 
the Government feared a repetition of the southern 
racial riots, when the miners took matters into their 
own hands. It was probably largely because of this 
that the Government was so ready to act quickly in 
Queensland, for example, in 1890 on the question of the 
Russell field. On this occasion an unlimited extension 
of the three-year period of exclusion was rushed 
through in a few days, since the white diggers had not, 
as expected, cleared out the alluvial gold before the end 
of the three years, and threatened a riot if the Chinese 
were allowed to enter the field. A similar threat ap-
peared on the Freshwater field in 1891, and the Act of 
1890 (the New Goldfields Act) had to be hastUy 
applied. The Goldfields Act Amendment Act of 1877, 
with its increase in fees for Chinese miners (and busi-
nessmen), indirectly furthered the interests of the 
white diggers, for though the ostensible aim of increas-
ing revenue from the Chinese was a failure, and it was 
repealed in 1878, the great influx was stemmed and 
their numbers in fact decreased. The Goldfields Act 
Amendment Act of 1878, which kept Chinese from a 
new goldfield for three years after its discovery in-
stead of charging them higher fees, and the New Gold-
fields Act of 1890, which extended this period of ex-
clusion indefinitely, were stiU more effective in stop-
ping the fiood of immigration to the fields (though 
they created new problems by driving many Chinese 
into other occupations). 
It would seem, particularly in view of these last 
two Acts, that the Government was concerned to pro-
tect the European working miner's interests—Mines 
Regulation Acts also protected his life and health— 
even though the miners were not yet a strong and 
well-organised pressure group. It is a debatable point, 
however, whether the miners would have received quite 
such ready support if the Government had not been 
afraid of the recurrence of the southern racial riots, or 
if the miners' interests had not been so closely tied to 
issues which affected the population in general. 
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C. The Working Man (1911-1918) 
By MARGARET BIRRELL 
This Paper is an attempt to give some account of 
the condition of the working man between the rule 
under the Premiership of Digby Denham followed by 
Labour's first term in office as a majority government, 
under the leadership of T. J. Ryan. It was in this 
period that the ever-increasing strength of organised 
labour was bringing about changes in the working-
man's place in the poHtical and economic spheres of 
society. These changes were being effected with the 
retreat of the Liberal party attitude that the demands 
of Labour ignored economic laws, and if granted, would 
bring about no real improvements in the condition of 
the working-classes. The workers, said the "Courier," 
"nominally benefited by reduced hours of work and 
higher wages, are in a worse position than ever owing 
to increased prices which are demanded to make good 
the increased cost of production," and the editor ex-
pressed the hope that "one result of the general indus-
trial unrest may be to direct the closer attention of the 
workers to the unalterable laws which affect their phy-
sical and social well-being." <i' Labour, of course, con-
tinued the fight to substitute for Liberal concepts in 
government its own social and economic theories, and 
by 1918 Avas undoubtedly reaping substantial benefits 
from the extent of its success in strengthening, 
through industrial legislation, the position of the em-
ployee as against that of the employer, backed as the 
latter was by the power of capital, and in attempting 
to remedy social injustice resulting from economic in-
equalities, by an extension of the activities of the 
State into spheres formerly the monopoly of private 
enterprise. However the Liberals were not proved en-
tirely wrong, and a constant feature throughout this 
period which saw the culmination of the success of 
working-class political organisation was the demand 
for a "living wage" and the complaints that increased 
wage rates barely kept pace with the continued rise in 
the cost of living. 
Although the number of factories in Queensland was 
steadUy increasing, a greater proportion of her popu-
(1) "Courier" (Editorial) 6/1/12. 
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lation was as yet engaged in primary than in secondary 
industry. Moreover, a large percentage of the working 
class in this State were unskilled and their occupations 
were more subject to reverses than were the skilled 
trades. <2' Apart from the seasonal nature of much em-
ployment, however, and its being at the mercy of 
drought and the state of the market for primary pro-
ducts, pastoralists and farmers complained of the 
migratory tendencies of their labour force. <2' Wages 
in these occupations were poor; for example, the ruling 
rates for dairy hands in 1911 were from 15 to 25 shil-
lings a week with found, and those for stockmen 20 to 
30 shillings and found.**' The position was somewhat 
better in skilled trades such as building and engineer-
ing, and the clothing trade, which were expanding, so 
that manufacturers persuaded the Denham Govern-
ment to alter its migration policy to help meet the de-
mand for this class of labour. *5> A decline in gold pro-
duction, however, meant that as time went on an in-
creasing number of miners were without employ-
ment. <^> In those occupations which possessed Wages 
Boards consisting of representatives of employers and 
employees, with power to make awards with regard to 
hours and wages, conditions were, in general, improved, 
but sweating still persisted, especially in the employ-
ment of women and girls, an example quoted in the 
Legislative Assembly being that of laundresses who 
earned an average of £3/2/6 daily for their employers 
but were paid only 17/6 a week, there being at the 
time no wages board for the trade, f'^* 
It cannot be said that the strengthening of the 
position of the working man through industrial organ-
isation was looked upon with favour by the Liberal 
administration in Queensland. The activities in which 
trade unions might legally engaged were limited by the 
unwillingness of the Government to amend the now 
archaic Trade Unions Act of 1886 and certain sections 
of the Criminal code, to permit unions to use their 
funds for political purposes, to protect the said funds 
from the actions of individual members, or to allow 
unionists to engage in peaceful picketing and persuade 
(2) Pari. Papers 1915 Vol. Ill p. 80.3. 
(3) Pari. Papers 1913 Vol. Ill p. 163: 1914 Vol. Ill p. 43. 
(4) Pari. Papers 1912 Vol. II p. 918. 
(5) "Courier" 6/1/12; 18/1/12. 
(6) Pari. Debates 1912 Vol. CXI. p. 7-
(7) Qld. Pari. Debates Vol. CXVI, 1913, pp. 2060-1. 
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their fellow workers to strike without bringing them-
selves within the law of conspiracy. (^ ) Employers, 
however, could and did dismiss men for mere member-
ship of a trade union. The climax, more or less, of this 
sort of activity on the part of employers, was the 
General Strike of 1912, the result of the efforts of the 
Brisbane Tramways Company, aided and abetted by 
the Government, to prevent unionism among its em-
ployees.'" When the next session of Parliament 
opened the Government immediately introduced the 
Industrial Peace Bill which added to the system of 
Wages Boards an Industrial Court with for the most 
part appellate jurisdiction only.<i°) Labour's main 
criticisms of the Act were its failure to recognise 
unions in the system it established and the delays in-
volved in effecting settlements.*") 
The rising cost of living in these years prior to the 
outbreak of war was reflected in the frequency with 
which workers were appealing to the Industrial Court 
against the awards of Industrial Boards, (i^ ) According 
to the figures of the Commonwealth Government Stat-
istician, Mr. Knibbs, the advance in the cost of living 
had been nearly 25% between the years 1901 and 
1913, <i3) and it was complained in the columns of the 
"Worker" that the unchecked activities of trusts and 
combines caused unnecessary rises in food prices. <''') 
The year 1914, however saw an acceleration of these 
trends not only as a result of the outbreak of war in 
Europe but through the ravages of a severe drought, 
and Knibbs estimated that in the last six months of 
1914 the cost of food in Queensland rose by 10%. The 
ill-effects of the first months of war in Queensland 
were, according to the then Director of Labour, due to 
the "lack of industrial enterprise or industrial skill," 
which meant that this State suffered dislocation but 
missed out on the advantages to be reaped by secon-
dary industry. (15) There was much distress in the 
Western mining districts through the temporary close 
down of markets for minerals such as tin, but the ap-
(8) Pari. Papers 1913 Vol. Ill, p. 137: Pari. Debates Vol. CXI 1913. pp. 346-8. 
(9) Qld. Pari. Debates 1910 Vol. CVII, pp. 2754-78. "Courier" 28/2/12 (Mr. Jusrice 
Higgins' Award). 
(10) Bernays: Qld. Politics During Sixty Years, pp. 483-4. 
(11) Pari. Papers 1914 Vol. Ill p.60. 
(12) Pari. Papers 1913 Vol. Ill p. 60. 
(13) "Worker" 12/2/14. 
(14) "Worker" 13/3/13. 
(15) Pari. Papers 1915 Vol. Ill p. 803. 
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peals of the miners to the Government for advances 
with their minerals as security were rejected. <i**> The 
drought caused unemployment by bringing about a de-
cline in agricultural and pastoral production and this 
together with the war, which opened up markets for all 
the foodstuffs Queensland could export, caused the rise 
in the cost of living, the pace of which was to increase 
despite Government attempts at control. 
To prevent hoarding of stocks and profiteering 
the Denham government set up Control of Prices 
Boards to fix maximum prices of goods. In the first 
place, the community was angered by the action of 
these Boards in fixing the prices of commodities at a 
higher rate than was then ruling,*'^' and in the second 
place their efforts were to a large extent in vain be-
cause producers exported their goods to the southern 
States and Europe where they obtained the higher 
rates it was endeavoured to prevent their receiving at 
home. (18) The most striking example was afforded by 
the meat industry where the higher rates paid to those 
exporting to the Imperial forces under an agreement 
with Britain made a mockery of price fixing at home 
where the price of beef rose from 6d. a pound shortly 
before the war to 1/- a pound in 1915 (") The final blow 
to the government's popularity was the cessation of 
automatic increases to the lower paid branches of the 
Public Service as a war economy measure, whUe some 
highly paid officials were granted increases by execu-
tive minute. (2") 
It was, then under the circumstances, hardly sur-
prising that the Denham Government, held up as the 
"low wage and dear meat party," suffered a resound-
ing defeat in the elections of 1915, and the Labour 
Party was returned with forty-five seats in a House of 
seventy-two members. The new Government, under 
the Premiership of T. J. Ryan, set to work immedi-
ately to improve the conditions of the working man by 
several lines of action. In the first place, the adminis-
tration was ready to take drastic steps to halt 
profiteering and speculation in food and other neces-
saries. In the next place they were pledged to repeal 
(16) Qld. Pari. Debates Vol. CXIX (1914) pp. 735-7. 
(17) Qld. Pari. Debates Vol. CXVII pp. 814-5. 
(18) Qld. ParL Debates Vol. CXVllI (1914) p. 1177 (Denham). 
(19) "Worker" 6/7/16. 
(20) Qld. Pari. Debates Vol. CXIX (1914) : (Ryan's "Want of Confidence") 
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the Industrial Peace Act and to translate into legis-
lation the.various principles held by the Labour Party 
and the unions in the industrial field; and, finaUy, they 
were prepared to establish State enterprises where it 
was considered that the unchecked activities of pri-
vate enterprise were harmful to the less fortunate 
sections of the community. Immediately upon taking 
over office, Ryan appointed Judge Macnaughton of the 
Industrial Court, a Royal Commission to enquire into 
the cost and supply of flour and wheat, it being known 
that millers were making their fortunes through specu-
lation.'^D The drain of butter supplies to Victoria 
where it was being sold at 220 shillings per cwt. while 
the Queensland price was fixed at 190 shillings was 
stopped by the Government stepping in and buying up 
all supplies. All meat exports except for Imperial pur-
poses were held up, and the sugar and wheat crops 
were commandeered and their prices regulated. (2^ ) 
This was the most significant period so far in 
Queensland history with regard to the introduction of 
far-reaching and liberal industrial legislation. To re-
place the unpopular Industrial Peace Act, an Industrial 
Arbitration Bill was introduced, abolishing the system 
of Boards and raising the status of the Industrial 
Court to a level with the Supreme Court. It was to be 
given power to make rulings with regard to the cost 
of living, hours of labour, and minimum wage rates. 
Moreover the decisions of the Court were to be final 
and unimpeachable for any informality, this being to 
protect the workers' interests against large and power-
ful companies such as the Colonial Sugar Refining 
Company, which, whenever adversely affected by an 
industrial award, never rested, according to Theodore, 
until it had defeated it by hiring the best legal talent 
in the land, (^ s) The Bill gave full recognition to trade 
unions and in fact the clause granting preference to 
trade unionists in industry caused the rejection of the 
Bill by the Legislative Council, and it did not become 
law tiU the end of 1916 with the preference clause 
omitted. 
The Workers' Compensation Act of 1915 not only 
increased scales of compensation but established a 
State Insurance Office with a monopoly of accident in-
(211 "Worker" 10/6/15: Pari. Debates Vol. CXX, p. 42. (Motion). 
(221 "Worker" 8/7/16; 22/7/15; 29/7/15. 
(2,f) Qld. Pari. Debates Vol. CXX (1915) p. 574. 
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surance, and moreover made it compulsory for an em-
ployer to insure his men, it having been a weakness 
of the previous act that employers of injured men were 
sometimes unable to pay the compensation awarded. '•'^*> 
The fact that the State was not concerned to make a 
profit from insurance resulted in much reduced 
premiums, a benefit to employees. An added protection 
for the worker was the inclusion in the Act of a fixed 
schedule of compensation which not only eliminated a 
great amount of litigation but ensured a fair deal to the 
victim or his dependents. A most humane aspect of the 
legislation regarding workers' compensation was the 
extension in the 1916-17 session to include sufferers 
from occupational diseases who were incapacitated 
from working, in particular to victims of miner's 
phthisis, whose condition previously had been 
wretched. '•'^^> Another very desirable and long sought 
for piece of legislation was the extension of the terms 
of the Workers' Accommodation Act to classes of 
workmen in addition to shearers and sugar workers, a 
reform which brought about improved and more sani-
tary living conditions for country labourers. (2^ ' 
With the coming of Labour to office there had 
been a reorganisation of the Department of Labour ac-
companied by a much stricter policy of inspecting the 
observance of safety and sanitary regulations in shops 
and factories and investigating to ensure against 
breaches of awards, so that whereas from July 1914 to 
July 1915 there had been 22 prosecutions for non-
observance of the various acts, in the next twelve-
month period there were 431 prosecutions and 230 
from July 1916 to July 1917, (27) and moreover £9,110/ 
6/5 in arrears of wages was secured by the Depart-
ment for employees who had previously hesitated to 
take action against their employers in this respect. 
With the progress of the war and the severity of the 
drought, unemployment increased, the building trades, 
and the pastoral and meat industries being worst 
affected. (^ 8) Thus the necessity was all the greater for 
the reform of the system of labour agencies in order 
to get better facilities for the exchange of labour be-
(24) Qld. Par i . Debates Vol . CXX (1915) p p . 375. 627. 
(251 " W o r k e r " 11/1 /17 . 
(26) Qld. Par i . Debates Vol . CXIV (1913) p . 2414; ( R y a n : Vol. CXX (1915)) p . 459. 
(27) Pari . Papers 1915 Vol. I l l , p . 834; 1916-17 Vol. I l l p . 36; 1917 Vol. II p . 1041. 
(28) Par i . Papers 1916-17 Vol . I l l p . 35. 
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tween one part of the State and another and to enable 
a more accurate estimation of the state of the labour 
market. (29) That these exchanges did valuable work 
may be established from the fact that whereas from 
July 1914 to July 1915 9,095 men registered in the 
Labour Exchanges and 5,592 were placed in jobs, in 
1916-17 30,191 men were registered and 15,780 were 
sent to employment. (29) These figures, of course, also 
illustrate the severity of the unemployment situation 
and whereas in earlier years the great majority of men 
applying to the agencies had been single men there was 
now an almost equal number of men with dependents. 
The most notable example of the State entering 
into competition with private enterprise was the es-
tablishment of State butchers' shops throughout 
Queensland, the operations of which by 1916 had 
forced the price of beef down from 1/- a pound in 1915 
to 6^d. a pound. The State sawmills were apparently 
less successful, although they did supply timber for 
workers' dwellings at a reduced rate.(^°) Despite all 
efforts at control, however, the cost of living continued 
to rise, and according to Knibbs prices between the 
outbreak of war and February 1916 had increased in 
Brisbane by 47.2%.(^D Thus, at the end of the period 
under consideration the working classes were still com-
plaining that wages were barely able to keep pace with 
the prices of necessary commodities. It cannot be 
doubted nevertheless, that the position of the working 
man had been materially improved since 1911 and 
more especially since 1915, and, though discontent with 
regard to prices and unemployment did exist, the 
working man acknowledged his gratitude for such pro-
gress as had been made by returning Labour as the 
Government in the 1918 elections with an even greater 
majority than before. 
(29) Pari. Papers 1916-17 Vol. Ill p. 37. 
(30) "Socialism at Work" pp. 21-25. 
(31) "'I^orker" 6/4/16. 
